



Policy paper: Alternatives to a political directive for the civilian population in Gaza

Executive Summary

1. The State of Israel is required to bring about a significant change in the civilian reality in the Gaza Strip in light of the Hamas crimes that led to the "Iron Swords" war. To this end, it must decide what the political goal is in relation to the civilian population in Gaza that must be pursued at the same time as the overthrow of the Hamas regime.
2. The target that will be defined by the government requires intensive action to harness the US and other countries in support of this goal.
3. Basic assumptions for work in each directive:
 - א. The collapse of Hamas rule.
 - ב. The evacuation of the population outside the combat zone is in the interest of the citizens of the Gaza Strip.
 - א. It is required to plan and channel international aid that will reach the region in accordance with the selected directive.
 - ב. In each directive, it is required to carry out an in-depth process of assimilating an ideological change (de-na tsipikatya).
 - ג. A selected directive will support the political goal regarding the future of the Gaza Strip and an end picture of the war.

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4. In this document, three possible alternatives will be presented as a directive of the political level in Israel in relation to the future of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip, each directive was examined in light of the following characteristics:

- **Operative** - the ability to realize operationally.
- **Legitimization** - international / internal / legal.
- **The ability to make an ideological and perceptual change** among the population in relation to Jews and Israel.
- Broad strategic implications.





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5. The three alternatives examined are:

- Alternative A: The population remaining in Gaza and bringing in PA rule.
- Alternative B: The population remaining in Gaza and the emergence of local Arab rule.
- Alternative C: Evacuation of the civilian population from Gaza to Sinai.

6. From an in-depth look at the alternatives, the following insights can be stood for:

- א. **Alternative C - the alternative that will yield positive and long-term strategic results for Israel, and is a feasible alternative. Determination of the political echelon is required in the face of international pressure with an emphasis on harnessing the US and other pro-Israeli countries to the move.**
- ב. Alternatives A and B suffer from significant deficiencies, mainly in terms of their strategic implications and long-term infeasibility. Both will not provide the necessary deterrent effect , will not allow a change of mind, and may lead within a few years to the same problems and threats that the State of Israel faced from 2007 until today.
- ג. Alternative A is the alternative with the most risks, the division in the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza is one of the main factors making it difficult to establish a Palestinian state. **Choosing this alternative means an unprecedented victory for the Palestinian national movement, a victory that will come at the cost of thousands of Israeli citizens and soldiers and**

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does not guarantee Israel's security .





alternative a

The remaining of the civilian population in Gaza and the importation of PA rule

location and rule

1. Most of the population remains in Gaza.
2. Israeli military government in the first stage; Later, the PA was imported and placed as the governing body in Gaza. **operational meanings**

1. Requires fighting in a populated area. It involves the risk of our soldiers and requires a lot of time.
2. The longer the intense fighting continues, the greater the risk of opening a second front in the north.
3. The Gaza population will oppose PA control (tried in the past).
4. Humanitarian responsibility - at the end of the war is fully imposed on Israel for all that is implied. **International / legal legitimacy**

1. At first glance, this appears to be a less severe humanitarian alternative and therefore would be easier to win widespread support. But in practice, an alternative involving leaving the population could be the worst, since many Arab deaths are to be expected in the operational phase, as long as the population remains in the cities and is involved in the fighting.
2. The execution time will be prolonged, and with it the period of time in which photos of civilians injured in the fighting will be published.
3. Military rule over the Arab population will make it difficult for Israel to maintain broad international support and will lead to creating pressure for the establishment of a PA government.

Creating ideological change

1. It is imperative to shape a public narrative of internalizing the failure and moral injustice of the Hamas movement, and replacing the old concept with a moderate Islamic ideology. This is a process similar to the process of denial and expectation that was carried out in Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Among other things, it will be essential to dictate the teaching materials of the schools and enforce their use for an entire generation.
2. The PA Knesset will make it very difficult to write study materials that will teach Israel's legitimacy. Even now the teaching materials of the Palestinian Authority

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- similar to those of Hamas - educate for hatred and hostility towards Israel.
- 3. It is possible to condition the importation of the Palestinian Authority on Israeli dictation of the study materials, but it is impossible to ensure that this will actually be carried out, since the Palestinian Authority itself is fundamentally hostile to Israel.
- 4. It should be appreciated that the Palestinian Authority will not work firmly to shape a public narrative of understanding the failure and moral injustice of the Hamas movement, and will not work to promote a moderate Islamic ideology.
- 5. Even today, there is widespread public support for Hamas in Yesh. The PA leadership is seen throughout Israel as corrupt and hollow, and it loses to Hamas in terms of public support.





strategic implications

1. The Palestinian Authority is a body hostile to Israel that stands on chicken's knees. Its strengthening may cause a strategic loss for Israel.
2. The division between the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza is one of the main obstacles today to the establishment of a Palestinian state. It is impossible that the result of this attack will be an unprecedented victory for the Palestinian national movement and paving the way for the establishment of a Palestinian state.
3. The current model in YUS, of Israeli military rule and civilian rule of the PA, is unstable and its future is clouded. It is tolerated in Yush only thanks to the extensive Jewish settlement in the entire region. This is because there is no possibility of Israeli military control without the presence of Jewish settlement (and one should not expect the commitment of settlement movements under the conditions of bringing the PA back to Gaza).
4. There is no way to maintain an effective military occupation in Gaza only on the basis of a military presence without settlement, and in a short time there will be an internal Israeli and international demand for withdrawal - meaning an interim situation that will not gain long-term international legitimacy - similar to the situation of the Yush today, only worse. The State of Israel will be considered a colonialist power with an occupation army. Outposts and bases will be attacked and the PA will deny any involvement.
5. **Tried and failed** - it should be mentioned that the outline of handing over the territory to the Palestinian Authority and then removing military control was tried in 2006 - Hamas won the elections and then took over the Strip by force, there is no justification for the Israeli national war effort to occupy Gaza if in the end we repeat the same mistake that led to the current situation) All-out war with Hamas.
6. **Deterrence** - this alternative will not achieve the required deterrence towards Hezbollah, on the contrary, this alternative points to a deep Israeli weakness which will signal to Hezbollah that they will not pay a real price for a confrontation with Israel, since at most it will carry out a move similar to the one

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carried out in Lebanon in the past - a limited time takeover , and finally withdrawal.

7. If the IDF fights to occupy the Strip, but the political result will ultimately be the rule of the Palestinian Authority and the transformation of the Strip, once again, into a hostile entity, Israel's ability to recruit fighters will be fatally damaged. Such a move would be a historic failure and an existential threat to the future of the country.





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alternative B

The population remaining in Gaza and the emergence of local Arab rule

location and rule

1. Most of the population remains in Gaza.
2. **Government in the first stage** - Israeli military government; **As an interim solution** - a continued attempt to build a local Arab political leadership, not Islamist, to manage civil aspects in the outline of the existing government configuration in the United Arab Emirates, **a permanent solution to this alternative is not in sight** .
3. Humanitarian responsibility - at the end of the war is fully imposed on Israel for all that is implied.

Operational performance

1. Requires fighting in a populated area. It involves the risk of our soldiers and requires a lot of time.
2. The longer the intense fighting continues, the greater the risk of opening a second front in the north.

International/legal legitimacy

1. Similar to alternative A, this alternative would require fighting in a populated area and would result in many deaths.
2. The execution time will be long, Hamas will take advantage of this for a PR effort in the framework of which photos of 'civilians being killed' by Israel will be published.
3. Military rule over a civilian population will make it difficult for Israel to maintain broad international support over time.

Creating ideological change

4. In the current situation, the absence of local opposition movements to Hamas that

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can be controlled locally. That is, even if a local Emirati-style leadership is established, these are still Hamas supporters.

5. This situation will greatly complicate the creation of the necessary ideological change and the eradication of Hamas as a legitimate movement. For comparison, in the process of Germany's deification, the post-occupation government was based on leaders who opposed the Nazis.
6. In the absence of a broad local movement committed to the ideological eradication of Hamas, it will be difficult to produce the necessary ideological change.





strategic implications

- In the short term, the overthrow of Hamas and the occupation of the Strip will be significant steps to restore Israeli deterrence and change reality.
- However, it seems that the deterrent effect will not be sufficient and adequate in relation to the severity of the surprise attack. Also, the message that will be conveyed to Hezbollah and Iran will not be decisive enough. The Gaza Strip will continue to be fertile ground for influence attempts and the re-emergence of terrorist organizations.
- It is likely that such a move would gain the support of the Gulf countries due to the heavy blow that would be dealt to the AHS movement, but the amount of casualties among the Gaza Arabs involved in the move would make it difficult.
- In the long term, there will be intra-Israeli and international pressure to replace the Israeli military government with a local Arab government as soon as possible, there is no guarantee that the new leadership will oppose the spirit of Hamas.
- A local Arab government will find it very difficult to carry out the necessary narrative and ideological change, because in Gaza lives a whole generation that was brought up at the knees of Hamas ideology, and will now also experience the Israeli military occupation. The likely scenario is therefore not an ideological change of perception, but the establishment of new, perhaps even more extreme, Islamist movements.
- This alternative also does not provide Israel with any long-term strategic value. On the contrary, it may prove to be a strategic burden within a few years.



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alternative C

Evacuation of the civilian population from Gaza to Sinai

location and rule

1. Due to the fighting against Hamas, the evacuation of the non-combatant population from the fighting area is required.
2. Israel will work to evacuate the civilian population to Sinai.
3. In the first phase, tent cities will be established in the Sinai area; Later, the creation of a humanitarian corridor to aid the civilian population of Gaza and the construction of cities in the resettled area in North Sinai.
4. A sterile zone of several kilometers should be created inside Egypt and the population should not be allowed to return to activity/residence near the Israeli border and this is in addition to creating a security perimeter in our territory near the border with Egypt.

operational

1. A call for the evacuation of the non-combatant population from the battlefield of the Hamas attack.
2. In the first phase, operations from the air focusing on the north of the Gaza Strip to enable the ground maneuver to an area that is already evacuated and does not require combat in an area saturated with civilian population.
3. In the second phase, a ground maneuver to occupy the territory gradually from the north and along the border until the occupation of the entire strip and the cleansing of the underground bunkers from Hamas fighters.
4. The intensive ground maneuver phase will take less time compared to alternatives A and B and therefore will reduce the time of exposure to the opening of the northern front at the same time as the fighting in Gaza.
5. It is important to leave the southbound traffic lanes usable to allow the evacuation of the civilian population in the direction of Rafah.

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International/legal legitimacy

1. At first glance, it seems that this alternative, which involves a significant evacuation of a population, could be complex in terms of international legitimacy.
2. In our estimation, fighting after the evacuation of a population will lead to fewer casualties among the civilian population compared to the expected number of casualties if the population remains (as appears in alternatives A + B).





Massive migration from combat zones (Syria, Afghanistan, Ukraine) and population movement is a natural and necessary result in light of the dangers involved in remaining in the combat zone.

3. Even before the war, [there was a great demand for migration](#) outside of Gaza among the local population and the war is only expected to increase this phenomenon.

4. **Legally:**

א. This is a defensive war against a terrorist organization that carried out a military invasion of Israel.

ב. The requirement to evacuate a non-combatant population from the area is an accepted method that saves human lives and this is how the Americans acted in Iraq in 2003.

ג. Egypt has an obligation under international law to allow the passage of population.

5. Israel must work to promote a broad diplomatic initiative with the goal of countries that will help the evacuated population and that will agree to take them in as immigrants.

6. For a list of countries that are eligible and will participate in the initiative, see Appendix A to this document.

7. In the long term, this alternative will gain wider legitimacy since it is a population that will be integrated into a state framework with citizenship.

Creating ideological change

1. Even in this alternative, it will be necessary to change the ideological perception of the population, but Israel will not have the ability to control the program since it takes place outside its territory.

2. In relation to alternatives A and B, instilling a sense of failure among the population will help create an improved security reality for many years and discourage the population.

strategic implications

1. **Deterrence** - this appropriate response will allow the creation of a significant deterrence in the entire area, and will be the conclusion of sending a strong message to Hezbollah that it will not enjoy making a similar move in southern Lebanon.
2. The overthrow of Hamas will be supported by the Gulf countries. In addition, this alternative will be a significant and unequivocal blow.
3. This alternative will strengthen Egyptian rule in North Sinai. We must take care of limiting the introduction of weapons into North Sinai and not give legitimacy to changing the demobilization clauses of the peace agreement.
4. The matter should be involved in a broader effort of denouncing the AHS in Egypt and the world in general, and making the organization as isolated and bad as 'Daesh' - from a legal point of view, all over the world and especially in Egypt.





Appendix A: Countries and entities that can contribute to the solution of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza

United States

Possible contribution: assistance in promoting the initiative in front of many countries including exerting pressure on Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates to contribute to the initiative or with resources or the absorption of displaced persons.

Incentives : interest in a clear Israeli victory and restoring the deterrence of the entire West that was damaged due to the attack on Israel. Restoration of its position as a world leader and a key country for solving crises. Interest in creating a significant regional change and giving a blow to the radical axis.

Egypt

Possible contribution: opening of crossings and immediate absorption of population from Gaza who will leave and gather in areas in Sinai; to allocate an area for settlement; exerting political pressure on Turkey and other countries to do so in preference to the absorption of a large number of displaced persons; A security envelope for the initial organizing areas outside the strip.

Possible incentives:

Pressure from the United States and European countries to take responsibility and open the Rafah crossing to exit to Sinai; Financial aid for the current economic crisis in Egypt.

Saudi Arabia

Possible contribution: absorption baskets and a budget for organizing efforts to

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transfer the population to different countries; In a non-public way, campaigns will be budgeted that present the damage that Hamas causes and damage its image.

Incentives: pressure from the United States in addition to the commitment to use the defense umbrella of the battle groups diverted to the area against Iran as an insurance certificate; interest in positioning Saudi Arabia as helping Muslims in crisis; Saudi interest in a clear Israeli victory over Hamas.





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European countries and in particular the Mediterranean - Greece/Spain

Contribution: absorption and settlement.

Incentives: Absorption baskets and financial support for the benefit of the process from the Arab countries.

Additional North African countries (Morocco, Libya, Tunisia)

Contribution: absorption and settlement; Immediate assistance in the organizing areas outside the Strip.

Incentives: absorption baskets and financial support for the benefit of the process from Arab countries; Arab brotherhood; pressure from European countries; Action through the ties that Israel has with some of those countries in a way that will allow them to maintain these ties while their image among the Arabs of the world is not damaged.

Canada

Contribution: Absorption of a population and its settlement within the framework of the permissive immigration policy.

Large advertising agencies

Possible contribution : campaigns that promote the program in the Western world and the effort to solve the crisis in a way that does not incite and blacken Israel; Dedicated campaigns for a world that is not pro-Israel where they are focused on a message of aid to the Palestinian brothers and their rehabilitation even at the

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cost of a "scolding" or even offensive tone, in Israel, intended for populations that will not be able to receive any other message.

Dedicated campaigns **for the residents of Gaza themselves** to motivate them to agree to the plan - the messages should revolve around the loss of the land, that is, to make it clear that there is no longer any hope of returning to the territories that Israel will occupy in the near future, whether this is true or not. The picture should be "Allah saw to it that you lost this land because of the leadership of Hamas - you have no choice but to move to another place with the help of your Muslim brothers."

